Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring may be viewed as a transformation process that has emerged in the Middle East as an consequence of social struggle against the governments considered irresponsible and illegitimate, driven by the Arab nations’ demands for just freedom and free justice, the nations that either lost or preserved their power of will.

One of fascinating political outcomes of the process of transformation were the successful regime changes in the wake of nationwide unrests and uprisings in countries with "republican" model of governance as opposed to failed changes in the "monarchies", despite various level of unrest. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was one of those monarchies that saw limited public outcry with authorities largely unscathed by the Arab Spring.

Public movement commenced with simultaneous actions on 11 March, 2011 in the Eastern Province of the country, the cities of Hofuf, Awamiyah and Qatif. Scarce rallies confined to the Eastern Province that failed to attract masses, had lost their momentum by late 2012. Demands including right-to-drive for women, release of political prisoners and departure of ruling Saudi dynasty from the throne did not culminate in a mass social movement. Nevertheless, rigorous actions of the government against the protesters left 22 people dead.

Ibn Khaldun and Saudi Arabia

Unlike in other Arab states where widespread public protests turned into popular resistance movements that compelled governments to significant concessions or drastic measures, in Saudi Arabia, not only that leadership endured, but there was little chance of regime change explained by both domestic and external factors that can be divided into two categories.

Similar to other countries exposed or shielded from either negative or positive impact of the Arab Spring, the situation emanates from Saudi Arabia’s domestic factors that outweigh foreign ones in terms of efficiency, Domestic factors in turn, are subdivided into nature of the authorities, the people and the opposition. First and foremost, undemocratic regimes are the ones of minority, all associated with profit, affiliation and motive.

Underlying notion of the Ibn Haldun Umran science denotes philosophy of unity and spirit of solidarity that binds individuals belonging to one group. Resilience of the Saudi Arabian regime is underpinned by all three abovementioned elements that make it different from other regimes that were either toppled or faced fierce domestic opposition during the Arab Spring. Entire authority is based on profit, both material and non-material one. The Saudi Arabian authorities have managed to establish certain profit unity, both within the government and with wider public, and have so far successfully implemented that policy. Similar to other undemocratic regimes, greatest gain for the Saudi authorities is to retain power. Therefore, actions deemed threatening the regime are disproportionately confronted, with people punished and unrest subdued.

Affiliation is a sense of unity and solidarity that stems from same ancestral roots within a given group of individuals. If a certain government is to be divided into the center and periphery, Saudi Arabia can be classified as a "family", with thousands of descendants scattered around the country. Members of the family hold key government positions within the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Education and intelligence services. Same as in politics, "family" is a fulcrum of Saudi Arabia’s economy. While evaluating country’s response to various domestic and foreign challenges and threats, one must bear in mind that this is "Saudi" Arabia.

Motive-based connection is a sense emanating from thinking and solidarity among individuals that share no ancestral relations, unbound by common values, system of faith, outlook or mindset. This is another feature that distinguishes Saudi Arabia from other regimes either ousted or significantly challenged in the Arab Spring. Nature of governance in Saudi Arabia, since its inception, has always remained interconnected with religious outlook (Wahhabism/Salafism). Authorities consider theoretical and practical safeguarding, presentation and dissemination of religious outlook as a vital objective and do their best to achieve it.

Motivational bond is a key factor that leadership and people share. Saudi Arabia’s status of a "mission/country" is something that empowers the authorities with a supra-political legitimacy, both in the eyes of the ruling establishment and the people. Something that precludes protests from escalating into something bigger, since challenging the authorities implies questioning the religious righteousness of the state.

Petrol-prosperity and identity of the opposition

Another serious domestic component is the nature of the people of Saudi Arabia. Along with supra-political perception of a government’s legitimacy, "petrol-prosperity policy" pursued by the government undermines the trust towards opposition movements that challenge or question the authorities. Policy of social appeasing of the crowd was yet another factor that helped reduce the government’s chances of having to confront mass protests through the Arab Spring process.

Nature of the opposition is also a native factor. Failure of public protests to gain momentum and lack of adequate public outrage with respect to violent methods used against the protesters had to do with the fact that opposition in Saudi Arabia was conceived by the Shiite minority and it remains in their monopoly. Organizational handicap of being minority opposition is supplemented by the "Shiite movement" perception of the opposition in the eyes of the public. Therefore, government’s efforts of presenting it as such prevented the spillover of the protests beyond the Eastern Province. Ultimately, greater stratum of the society embraced government’s position with respect to the protests as legitimate.

It would be accurate to say that hurricane wreaking havoc in the Arab world, sparked by the flying spirit of Mohamed Bouazizi, is yet to crash ashore in Saudi Arabia, and there are no signs of it on the horizon.

Note: this article was once published in the "Analyst" magazine.

Eyup Ersoy (PhD)

Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey