Azerbaijan

23 Avqust 2011 13:00 (UTC+04:00)

Interview with Alexander Rahr, director of the Russian/Eurasia Program at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

How did the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008 influence Western energy policy in the Caspian region?

In general, EU policy in the Caucasus remains almost unchanged and the war in Georgia changed nothing. There is still a need for the EU’s more active and comprehensive participation in this region. Though after the Russo-Georgian war and the gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia the Caspian region has become more important for the EU in terms of energy, no remarkable changes have occurred in the EU’s activity in the region. It is a complete contrast to the policy of, for instance, such a global player as China, which is actively penetrating the Caspian region in search of new energy sources. Despite the existence of a number of documents defining the contours of EU involvement in the region, European policy is largely concentrated on issues of development and assistance to the Caucasian countries in the transition period, accentuating the issues of democracy and human rights. It is, unfortunately, not enough for success in achieving these goals in the region. The EU does not have enough political will for participation, for instance, in the resolution of regional conflicts, strategic leverage for the further integration of the Caspian littoral states with European structures, or the coordination of interests between the EU and the Caucasus.

Do you think that the EU takes into account the possibility of new destabilization of the situation in the region and even war (in Georgia or between Azerbaijan and Armenia) while building its energy strategy in the Caspian region?

Security and stability in an EU neighbouring region are priorities, since energy security will fail without positive development in this area. For this reason, the EU is interested in averting conflicts and wars by any means. On the other hand, due to limited resources to avert conflicts in the Caucasus, the EU must stay on the alert and not worsen ties with Russia - the biggest energy supplier to Europe. Therefore, the EU is facing a dilemma, as it is aware of the fragility of the situation in the South Caucasus countries.

Iran, in cooperation with Iraq, has proposed creating a gas pipeline as an alternative to Nabucco. How do you explain the emergence of this idea in Iran and what are the chances it will be carried out?

Iran has an economic interest in the transport of its gas to Europe. On the other hand, Iran could transport energy to the Persian Gulf states. In addition, the country needs the political support of neighbouring countries to overcome Western sanctions over its nuclear program. Iran is weak but its diplomacy is quite capable. In the future, Iran will seek an alliance with China and in this sense it is developing friendly ties with it.

The president of state oil company SOCAR said recently that Azerbaijan's participation in Nabucco is uncertain. Do you think this statement is serious? Do you think that participation in this project will be useful to Azerbaijan, rather than harmful?


Azerbaijan has no weighty grounds to refuse participation in this project. This statement was probably made for political reasons in order to raise Azerbaijan’s image as the fateful country for Nabucco, following Germany’s and Italy’s rejection of nuclear power, and the growing demand in these countries for diversified energy sources. Baku probably made the statement to get stronger support from the West on the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Turkey also uses this "blackmail" against the West, saying we will support Nabucco only if we're admitted to the EU.

What role does Europe give to Azerbaijan in Nabucco and other projects to transport energy from the Caspian region to EU countries?

As a gas producer and the one that has an outlet to the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan takes a key position in the Nabucco project. Additionally, the role of Turkmenistan in this project is frequently spoken of, since this Central Asian republic has six times as much gas as Azerbaijan. With gas supplies from Turkmenistan via Azerbaijan, the latter’s role as a transit country will grow. The issue is, however, about whether Turkmenistan will be a reliable partner for the West. It seems that Ashgabat sold its gas to China and Russia long ago, and may have nothing for Nabucco. The EU does not want to rely solely on Azerbaijan's gas, especially since Baku also sells its gas north and south. If no additional sources are found, Nabucco will never become a reality.